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A tool commonly used to aid the navigational decisions of pilots to avoid weather 
hazards is Next Generation Radar (NEXRAD), which provides information about 
geographically referenced precipitation. However, this tool is limited because, when pilots 
use NEXRAD, they have to infer the uncertainty in the meteorological information for both 
understanding current hazards as well as extrapolating the impact of future conditions. 
Recent advancements in meteorology modeling afford the possibility of providing 
uncertainty information concerning hazardous weather for the current flight. Although 
probabilistic weather products do not exist in today’s cockpit, it is critical to evaluate how 
operators might use or misuse such products when incorporating uncertainty information 
in their decision-making.  In addition, it is important to study how accurate a probabilistic 
decision aid needs to be for effective use by operators.  Although there are systematic biases 
that plague professional’s use of uncertainty information, there is evidence that presenting 
forecast uncertainty can improve weather-related decision-making. The current study 
investigates a simulated probabilistic component of a decision aid that renders flight-path 
risk as a probability that the route will come within 20 nmi radius (FAA recommended 
safety distance) of hazardous weather within the next 45 minutes of flight. The study 
evaluates four NEXRAD displays integrated with Flight-Route Risk Estimates for 
Enhanced Decisions (FRREED) providing varying levels of support. The “no” support 
condition has no FRREED (the NEXRAD only condition). The “baseline” support 
condition employs a FRREED whose accuracy is consistent with current capability in 




accuracy is likely at the top of what is achievable in meteorology in the near future.  The 
“high” support display provides a level of support that is likely unachievable in an aviation 
weather decision-making context without significant technological innovation. The results 
indicate that operators did rely on the FRREED to improve their performance over the no-
support condition (NEXRAD only).  The level of performance of the operators improved 
in terms of both calibration and resolution as the aids increased in accuracy. I will discuss 
the implications of the findings for the safe introduction of probabilistic decision aids in 








General aviation comprises of all civilian aircraft except the scheduled passenger aircraft. An 
extraordinarily high number of deaths occur in general aviation accidents. The accident rate in 
general aviation is very high: 6.51 per 100,000 flight hours (NTSB, 2014). In 2011, 18% of the 
general aviation accidents were fatal for 444 people (NTSB, 2014). General aviation accidents that 
year led to monetary losses between 1.64-4.64 $ billion (Sobieralski, 2013).   
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) (NTSB, 2014) identified that one of the 
major factors in general aviation accidents is hazardous weather. The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) has found that 20% (8657) of the general aviation accidents from 2003 to 
2007 had weather as one of the major contributing factors (FAA, 2010). Weather is an integral 
part of pilots’ flight operation, even with in-cockpit weather radar, it continues to pose a threat to 
flight operations and general aviation safety. This threat can be attributed both to the pilot and 
system errors.  
An analysis of the NTSB accident database from 1994-2014 on thunderstorm-related 
accidents revealed that convective weather is involved in 70% of fatalities (Boyd, 2017). The 
common factors amongst these fatalities identified by Boyd are non-adherence of pilots to FAA 
recommended minimum-separation-distance of 20 nmi from hazardous weather and tendency of 
pilots to select a riskier route (downwind) for circumnavigating convective weather. These factors 
highlight a need to identify the root cause behind pilot failures and provide proper aids accordingly. 
A considerable number of decision support tools have already been designed to decrease fatalities, 
but they still fail to reduce accidents. One of the reasons behind continuing failures in enhancing 




behind the uncertainty in the meteorological weather data for the pilot to interpret. A solution to 
this issue is to provide uncertainty information to pilots to increase their situation awareness about 
presented meteorological data. This thesis evaluates a novel probability-based Flight-Route Risk 
Estimates for Enhanced Decisions (FRREED) that provides a quantitative estimate of the 
uncertainty in meteorological weather data. 
The current study investigates a probability-based FRREED simulated for the NEXRAD 
display that can make pilots aware of the uncertainty in the weather data. The NEXRAD is a radar 
display, which provides geographically referenced precipitation activity. The FRREED provides 
the probability of a particular flight route intersecting the hazardous weather at least once 
(cumulative risk) during its course of flying. Hence, supports the user to select a safe route.   
Firstly, this thesis discusses the complexity of weather-related decision-making, and then it 
mentions how decision-making is prone to certain kinds of errors. Following this, there is a 
discussion on currently available weather products and their limitations. This discussion helps in 
establishing the importance of decision aids in general aviation cockpits with special attention to 
the need for probabilistic decision aids to enhance the decision-making of pilots in future cockpits. 
Lastly, the document discusses the description of the current study, methods used, results obtained, 
and the conclusion drawn. 
1.1 Weather-related decision making 
Weather-related decision making is a complicated process. Operations in inclement weather 
require pilots to make multiple evaluations and decisions including identification of the presence 
of a hazard, estimation of the proximity of weather, estimation of impact to the flight path and 




arrives from a variety of sources that include meteorological briefings, inflight weather reports, 
visual information from the cockpit, and the on-site reports (Hunter, Martinussen, & Wiggins, 
2003). Because of the dynamic environment of aircraft cockpits, these data change very quickly. 
Pilots have to monitor for changes and update their mental representation of the situation 
accordingly to maintain situational awareness. 
In the last few decades, there have been significant advances in improving designs for weather 
displays in both general and commercial aviation. However, weather displays are a complex 
system that comprises multiple weather information sources that have different spatial and 
temporal resolutions. There are multitude of problems that exist with current weather information 
systems like lack of remote sensing capability, lack of pilot reports, imprecise diagnostic products, 
imprecise forecasts, etc. (Bass & Minsk, 2001). This complexity makes it difficult for pilots to 
make swift and sound decisions during hazardous weather conditions (Elgin & Thomas, 2004). 
The situation is worse for general aviation because these aircraft are mostly smaller planes flying 
at low altitudes with low speeds, which make them more prone to adverse weather conditions (Wu, 
Ligda, Lim, Comerford, & Johnson, 2010).  
The main focus of this thesis is general aviation weather displays. The most common cause 
behind weather-radar-related accidents is either a failure in recognizing or in interpreting the 
weather information displayed in the cockpit (Wiggins, 2005). Even a small change in weather 
display symbology (colors and symbols) among general aviation pilots leads to credible 
differences in weather deviations, cognitive engagement, and weather display usage (Ahlstrom, 
2015). This evidence shows that a pilot’s understanding of weather data is fluid, and it can be 
affected by multiple factors. The first step towards solving the complexity involved in the weather-




errors. The next section elaborates on plan continuation errors, which is the most common 
decision-making error that pilots make. 
1.2  Plan Continuation Errors 
Research shows that even after pilots receive information that signals a need to revise their 
plan, they often continue to follow the original flight plan (Orasanu, Ames, Martin, & Davison, 
2001). This tendency is known as plan continuation errors. While following a flight plan, pilots 
should still monitor the airspace continuously to look for changes in airspace that might cause 
them to revise the initial flight plan. Plan continuation errors are more common with pilots that 
inadequately monitor their airspace. Muthard and Wickens (2002) found that pilots in simulations 
failed to revise their flight plan in response to hazardous elements in the airspace approximately 
one-third of the time and that pilots who demonstrated inadequate monitoring were most likely to 
commit these errors of omission.  
Plan continuation errors have also been observed when pilots decide on whether to continue 
from Visual Flight Rules (VFR) to Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) or to divert from 
their path (Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2002). The same study showed that pilots who observed 
deteriorating weather early in their flight path were more optimistic about the weather and chose 
to continue through it for an extended amount of time before deciding to divert. This delayed 
decision to divert was also influenced by their previous flying experience, with more experienced 
pilots deciding to divert earlier than less experienced pilots. This study showed that pilots are prone 
to underestimating the risk of continuing in deteriorating weather and that their understanding of 




information about flight paths and a need to train pilots so that they can make better flight path 
decisions in deteriorating weather.  
The evidence mentioned in this section shows that plan continuation errors are quite common 
in aviation. Some of the major underlying causes behind these errors are inadequate plan 
monitoring, underestimation of risk, inexperience, and so on. This thesis addresses the issue of 
plan monitoring and risk estimation by simulating and evaluating a probabilistic component of a 
decision support tool that, when used with NEXRAD, helps reduce plan continuation errors. 
Before describing this component, in the next section, I will elaborate on some of the issues in the 
current cockpit weather technology. 
1.3 Weather Products 
As discussed previously, plan continuation errors are known to affect decision making, 
performance, and safety of flight operation. Dutcher and Doiron (2008) emphasized the need to 
understand the reasons why pilots fail to take appropriate actions during deteriorated weather. 
They identified some of the possible causes were the pilots’ lack of knowledge about 
meteorological products and meteorology, limitations of technology, and inadequate pilot training 
to deal with the weather.  
A common theme in the literature is that pilots require meteorological products that provide 
not only real-time weather information but also adequate decision-making support as they 
multitask in a dynamic environment. However, this requires a proper representation of weather 
(e.g., graphical representation) with high spatial accuracy and temporal resolution. The following 
subsections will discuss some common weather products (with the emphasis on NEXRAD), how 





One of the most used displays in general aviation cockpits is NEXRAD. Fig. 1 shows a 
sample NEXRAD image (NOAA). It provides geographically referenced precipitation activity 
uplinked to cockpits through Flight Information Services Data Link (FISDL) (Wu et al., 2010). 
However, one of the major issues with NEXRAD is its latency in that the data reaches the cockpit 
5-7 minutes after it is received from the service provider and is refreshed in the cockpit only once 
every 5-7 minutes (Elgin & Thomas, 2004). Pilots have to use this 14-minute-old data to 
extrapolate current weather conditions and predict future conditions. Typically, pilots do not 
adequately account for this temporal delay, and they treat the information like real-time, which 
hampers their decision-making process. Another drawback of NEXRAD is that it does not help 
pilots understand the effect of weather cell movements on the flight path, which pilots have to 
estimate on their own. Thus, increasing the chance that during bad weather, pilots will overestimate 
or underestimate nearby weather risks, which can lead to plan continuation errors.    
 






National Convective Weather Forecast (NCWF), developed by the National Center for 
Atmospheric Research, provides current weather hazard information (using NEXRAD) and one-
hour prediction of hazardous weather through extrapolated polygons, as shown in Fig. 2.  NCWF 
focuses only on large areas of convective activity, not on areas less than 512 km2. The smoothed 
forecast contours have an approximate spatial resolution of 8 km (NCWF, 2007), which does not 
allow forecast for smaller convective areas that can be of importance in hazardous airspace. In this 
way, NCWF is only a deterministic forecast product in that it makes the pilots understand or 
interpret levels of uncertainty on their own. This thesis provides a solution to this limitation of 
NCWF by proposing a novel probabilistic Flight-Route Risk Estimates for Enhanced Decisions 
(FRREED) that accounts for uncertainty in forecasting.  
 






1.4 Decision making with NEXRAD 
As discussed earlier, NEXRAD provides precipitation information near the aircraft to 
support pilots with decision making. NEXRAD provide important perceptual information to help 
pilots deal with hazardous weather conditions, especially the location of hazardous weather cells 
around their flight path. As mentioned previously, the biggest challenge with NEXRAD, which 
has been studied extensively in the past, is the latency in the data that it. However, Knecht (2016) 
reviewed multiple NEXRAD studies and identified another major challenge that when using 
NEXRAD, pilots overestimate their distance from storms and underestimate the risk, which 
eventually leads them dangerously close to the hazardous weather. However, to date, the literature 
has not emphasized this underestimation of risk or provided satisfactory ways to make pilots aware 
of the uncertainty in forecasts. This risk estimation is further degraded because pilots have to 
manually estimate their distance from the storm. Knecht (2016) recommended a need for a 20-nmi 
range ring along with the own ship icon for the NEXRAD display. 
Many studies have looked at the limitations of NEXRAD. Yuchnovicz, Novacek, Burgess, 
and Stokes (2001) compared the use of NEXRAD with conventional pre-flight and in-flight 
weather products and found that, when compared to conventional products, NEXRAD does not 
improve pilot’s decision making. They concluded that even though NEXRAD provides pilots with 
more information, this additional information increased the pilots’ mental workload and decreased 
their time to make decisions. Beringer and Ball (2004) found that pilots with high-resolution 
NEXRAD images spent more time looking at them compared to pilots who had only low-
resolution images. The found that the pilots with high-resolution images were also more likely to 
continue to fly in deteriorated weather as they believed that they could fly around or in between 




guideline (FAA, 2013) that requires pilots to maintain at least 20-nautical mile (nmi) separation 
from hazardous weather.  
Burgess and Thomas (2004) demonstrated the inadequacy of current weather displays in 
aiding pilots during hazardous weather by providing pilots with improved weather displays 
equipped with either the NEXRAD or the NCWF. Weather-avoidance behavior of pilots was not 
significantly different between the two display conditions. They found that all the groups 
maintained a mean distance of 10 nmi from hazardous weather cells, which is half of the FAA 
recommended safety margin. They suggested that proper pilot training and display design 
improvement (in terms of proper representation of necessary information) are required steps in 
enhancing pilot decision-making and pilot performance. According to Burgess and Thomas 
(2004), the current weather displays are not designed specifically to support pilots’ higher level 
decision making because these displays do not help pilots to understand the impact of hazardous 
weather on their flight path. They determined that the displays provide pilots only with cues to 
predict the impact of hazardous weather by themselves. Hence, there is a need for decision aids in 
cockpits that can support both higher-level decisions and subsequent actions. The next section 
mentions some of the currently available decision aids, and their limitations and is followed by a 
description of a critical component that could potentially reduce some of the limitations of current 
decision aids, particularly limitations supporting spatial-temporal uncertainty. 
1.5 Weather-related decision aids in the cockpit 
The literature on decision support systems has a wide range of systems, from small-scale 
interventions to large-scale technical systems. Small scale interventions often provide extra alerts 




systems include weather displays with advance alerting information or decision-aiding cues to 
guide pilots’ decision-making process. Table 1 discusses some of the small- and large-scale 
decision aids designed for cockpits. Table 1 shows that most of the current small-scale aids 
inadequately improve pilot’s decision making, provide insufficient (or zero) knowledge about the 
uncertainty associated with a forecast, and do not help pilots follow the FAA guideline of 20 nmi. 
It shows that some common large-scale decision support systems in general aviation cockpits have 
also been found to provide inadequate support to pilots’ decisions. Thus, signals a need for 
improved information representation for current and future trajectories of aircraft to support pilots’ 
decision.  
Table 1 shows some of the large-scale aids that have attempted to implement probabilistic 
weather forecasts. However, these decision aids are inadequate in supporting the pilot’s decision 
making. Although these aids emphasized the need for probabilistic weather and uncertainty 
information, none of them provide any quantitative estimate of risk or uncertainty. Apart from 
these aids, not much has been done to develop probabilistic aids for pilots because probabilistic 
aids are difficult both to design and to implement. Calculating probabilities for weather data and 
presenting them in a comprehensible way to prevent underestimation or overestimation of risk is 
a complicated task that requires complex ensemble modeling. This thesis approaches this issue by 
simulating a predictive decision support tool that provides uncertainty information about weather-
cell movements to pilots. The next few sections discuss the concept of uncertainty and cumulative 
risk, along with the reasons why pilots fail to understand this information, what form of 
representation could make pilots more aware of this risk, and how this representation can be 





Table 1. Weather-related decision aids 
Study Weather-Related Decision Aids  Limitations 




In a cockpit simulator-based task, 
notification regarding nearby weather 
hazard leads to decrease in response time 
for identifying hazards. 
• Although the notifications 
facilitated response time to 
hazardous weather, the decision aid 
did not support pilots to follow the 





In a simulated flying task, pilots had a 
portable weather application that leads to 
increased weather situation awareness 
(WSA) and cognitive engagement 
(prefrontal oxygenation levels). 
• Pilots traveled a bit farther from the 
hazardous weather, but still 
violated the FAA guideline 
• No information about uncertainty 
was available to pilots. 




The ant-colony optimization algorithm was 
used to find hazardous-weather free routes 
in the airspace. 
• Multiple versions of the algorithm 
developed by various researchers 
can lead to different results. 
• No information about inherent 




Aviation Weather Data Visualization 
Environment (AWE) system provides 
graphical weather data in pilot’s region of 
interest to make go or no-go decision on 
the current path. 
• The system was specific to the 
pilot’s region of interest and can 
fail to provide the information 
regarding the overall generic 
weather scenario. 
• Can lead to underestimation of risk 




Rockwell Collins Enhanced Weather Radar 
(EWxR) system combines NEXRAD and 
onboard radar to overcome the attenuation 
and range limitations of the onboard radar. 
It also characterizes the cells as hazardous, 
possibly-hazardous, or non-hazardous 
based upon attributes like reflectivity level, 
storm speed, and height. 
• The system indicates uncertainty by 
stating weather cells as “possibly- 
hazardous.” However, the extent of 
uncertainty in quantitative format is 
missing. 
• Understanding uncertainty depends 
on comprehension of the word 
“possibly-hazardous”, leading to 




Rockwell Collins’ AWARE (Aviation 
Weather Awareness and Reporting 
• It only notifies the pilot about the 




and Kelly III 
(2005) 
Enhancements) system automatically 
analyzes the hazards in the weather data to 
alert pilots of impending hazards (like 
precipitation, icing, and turbulence) on 
their path. 
map but does not provide any 
information about whether this 
hazard region is low/high-risk 




Convective Weather Avoidance Model 
(CWAM) developed to provide 
deterministic and probabilistic weather 
avoidance fields (WAFs). 
• Even after getting both 
deterministic and probabilistic 
information, pilots were found to 
underestimate the risk associated 
with WAFs and intersect WAFs to 
avoid factors such as delay of the 
flight. 
1.6 Providing Forecast Uncertainty Information 
Pilots often have trouble understanding the amount of uncertainty in many meteorological 
weather products because these products typically contain no explicit statement of the inherent 
uncertainty in the forecast (Gigerenzer, Hertwig, Van Den Broek, Fasolo, & Katsikopoulos, 2005). 
Typically, weather forecasts for aviation provide precision through the use of numerical forecast 
products, which are “deterministic” in that they provide 100% probability forecasts of an adverse 
weather event at a specific time in the future. For instance, NCWF is a numerical forecast product 
that provides a 100% probability of a weather event through extrapolated polygons. This 
characteristic makes NCWF, and other numerical forecasts leave most of the uncertainty in 
weather prediction to be inferred by the pilot.  Unfortunately, past demonstrations have indicated 
that pilots tend to interpret weather information as nearly certain information (Burgess & Thomas, 
2004; Yuchnovicz et al., 2001).   
Advanced weather products do not provide information regarding weather forecast 
uncertainty in a clear and intuitive manner. Nor do they provide decision support tools that can 




underlying principle in the current study is that weather-related decision-making and performance 
is inextricably linked to how well pilots understand the uncertainties in weather data. 
Recent probabilistic weather products have tried to provide uncertainty information directly 
to pilots through cockpit information displays. Improvements in this capability will help pilots 
better understand that weather forecasts are not absolute, which will consequently improve 
aviation safety and efficiency.  Probabilistic forecasts will enable better calibration of people’s 
decisions regarding weather uncertainties, which may significantly reduce pilot workload and 
improve both flight execution and National Aviation Services (NAS) operations. However, this 
uncertainty information must be introduced into the cockpit carefully as behavioral decision theory 
has documented numerous systematic biases in the way humans process uncertainty information 
(Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). In the context of air traffic management, Gibbons, Holst, 
and Jonsson (2013) documented that although expert NAS operators understand that forecasts have 
errors and are uncertain, the operators are biased in their interpretations of weather information 
uncertainty. In other words, even when the operators in the Gibbons et al. study were aware of 
weather uncertainty; they were unable to include that in decision making. 
Not much has been done in the aviation context to understand the impact of weather 
uncertainty information on decision-making. However, some studies have demonstrated that 
forecast uncertainty information has been found to increase the understanding of weather forecasts, 
which leads to better calibrated and more beneficial decisions for both expert meteorologists and 
lay people (Joslyn & LeClerc, 2012; Joslyn, Nadav-Greenberg, Taing, & Nichols, 2009; Joslyn & 
Nichols, 2009; LeClerc & Joslyn, 2015; Nadav-Greenberg & Joslyn, 2009). Nadav-Greenberg and 
Joslyn (2009) demonstrated that repeated exposure to weather uncertainty information via training 




decisions. This finding, which is the major motivation for this thesis, led us to manipulate the 
interval of feedback in our training and test phase to understand how uncertainty information is 
utilized differently in each phase. 
Joslyn and Nichols (2009) argue against the long-believed notion that lay people find it 
easier to understand a frequency format compared to a probability format. They argue that all the 
studies favoring frequency formats ask participants to estimate the level of uncertainty on their 
own. However, daily weather forecast information provides uncertainty information and expects 
people to incorporate that information into their decision-making process. Joslyn and Nichols 
(2009) tested the effects of providing uncertainty information in both probability (90% chance of 
high wind speed) and frequency (9 out of 10) formats for the wind speed forecast of the day. They 
found that, contrary to previous research, the information presented in frequency formats was the 
most difficult for people to utilize to understand the wind speed warnings. Frequency formats led 
to the largest number of errors in both people’s decision making and their understanding of 
uncertainty. They observed that with the probabilistic format, people were better able to understand 
wind speed forecasts and make better decisions. These findings provide a good base for the chosen 
probabilistic format of the uncertainty-based FRREED proposed in this thesis.  
The studies mentioned so far in this section emphasize the need for uncertainty information 
in weather forecasts. This requires a quantitative measure of uncertainty.  In general, risk can be 
defined as the “combination of the probability of a consequence and its magnitude” and uncertainty 
is defined as the “lack of knowledge concerning outcomes that may result from an imprecise 
knowledge of the risk” (Willows, Reynard, Meadowcroft, & Connell, 2003). Interpreting 
uncertainty about events and associated outcomes requires risk assessment (Willows et al., 2003). 




life threatening. Risk assessment is possible from  data available from past events and can be used 
to calculate the risk and uncertainty of a future event (Willows et al., 2003). The probabilistic 
FREED simulated in this thesis will provide risk assessment regarding the flight route to make 
pilots aware of the risk and uncertainty related to a weather event. The FREED is intended to make 
operators aware of the cumulative risk associated with their exposure to hazardous weather 
throughout their flight.  
1.7 Probability Rendering of Uncertainty Information using Cumulative Risk 
An important characteristic of risk is that it is cumulative whenever there is either continuous 
exposure to the same risk factors for a long duration (e.g., smoking for years) or simultaneous 
exposure to multiple factors (e.g., smoking and drinking). However, people often perceive these 
risk factors as independent of each other, which leads to the underestimation of risk. Unfortunately, 
no studies have been done on cumulative risk in weather displays or aviation in general. In this 
section, I will cite some of the important findings from some other domains like healthcare, natural 
hazards, and so on to demonstrate the underestimation of cumulative risk. 
Quantitative risk-communication is a critical component of medical decision-making 
because informed medical-decision making requires an understanding of statistics. Primarily risk-
communication is necessary in the implementation of informatics or decision aids to support 
activities like conveying risk associated with various medical interventions like cancer treatment 
or screening for breast cancers, counseling patients during difficult decisions under uncertainty, or 
under shared medical decision making (Ancker, Senathirajah, Kukafka, & Starren, 2006; 
Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2008). There is some support for using graphical risk information to 




associated with incremental risk perceptions via pictographs for communicating side-effects of 
using tamoxifen for breast cancer (Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2008). However, individual differences 
between high and low numerates are prevalent in research pertaining to graphical vs. numerical 
conveyance of risk (Gaissmaier et al., 2012). 
One instance from medical decision making is the need for a proper understanding of long-
term risks and benefits associated with a treatment plan, which is required for patients to decide 
about the treatment as many treatments and diseases carry cumulative risk. A study (Fuller, 
Dudley, & Blacktop, 2004) illustrated that patients significantly misinterpreted, overestimated, and 
underestimated the risk associated with stroke over subsequent years after they received treatment 
for the first occurrence of stroke. The underestimation of cumulative risk has also been observed 
in the context of the perceived risk of sexually transmitted diseases (Knäuper, Kornik, Atkinson, 
Guberman, & Aydin, 2005).  
Cumulative risk has also been a major concern in the case of rare but catastrophic events. 
De La Maza, Davis, Gonzalez, and Azevedo (2019) studied the understanding of the cumulative 
risk associated with flooding risk for people in the US because flood is identified as one of the 
major disasters in the US, but still the demand for flood insurance even with discounted premiums 
was relatively low compared to what it should be due to high flood risk. They suspected that this 
might be because of the tendency of people to ignore risk pertaining to low-probability rare events 
and underestimating the cumulative nature of this low probability risk as potential factors in the 
flood risk situation. They found the majority of individuals following additive heuristic and 




The scenarios mentioned before demonstrate that conveying risk is a major concern in all 
the uncertain environments like catastrophic events (floods, earthquakes, and tsunamis), medical 
diagnosis and treatment intervention, chain-smoking, the effectiveness of contraceptive methods, 
and so on. More importantly, calibrating people’s judgment and choices to the actual cumulative 
risk seem to be a challenge in all the uncertain environments. However, in all the situations 
mentioned before, people, if taught, can calculate the cumulative risk associated with these events, 
because, for example, the risk of flood in year-1 is more or less independent of the risk of flood in 
say year-2 or -5. The same is not true in the case of storms represented via NEXRAD to pilots 
because one red cell is not independent of other red cells around it and the dynamics of those red 
cells are governed by the laws of fluid dynamics. Pilots are expected to estimate this mission-
centric risk to keep their flight path safe and the risk constantly changes making it almost 
impossible for any pilot to calculate that risk on their own and requires complex meteorological 
ensemble modeling.  
The goal of the current study is to convey this cumulative risk through a simulated 
probabilistic FRREED. In general, the cumulative risk is conveyed either in conjunctive or 
disjunctive probabilities (Doyle, 1997). Doyle found significant evidence that people understand 
disjunctive probabilities (probability of an event occurring at least once) more clearly compared 
to conjunctive probabilities (probability of an event never occurring). For example, pilots flying 
an aircraft in hazardous weather would like to know the chance of crossing the hazardous weather 
at least once in their flight (disjunctive). This thesis attempts to convey cumulative risk in a 
disjunctive manner to make pilots aware of the risk in such a hazardous situation. The next section 





1.8 Study Overview 
The focus of the current research study is to simulate and implement a probability-based 
FRREED for weather displays with a primary focus on convective weather displays (especially 
NEXRAD) and to understand participant behavior after inclusion of FRREED in the system. The 
participants were asked to decide about the safety of multiple flight routes based on the available 
weather information and/or the FRREED.  FRREED is a probability-based component that 
provides the probability of a particular route coming within a 20 nmi-radius-circle of hazardous 
weather. FRREED provides a probability, estimating the cumulative risk of the associated 
hazardous weather intersecting with the given flight route (at least once). The study investigates 
whether the participants can comprehend the uncertainty information presented to them and then 
make efficient use of the risk information to make better flight route safety decisions.  
The experiment design comprises of four participant groups supported by varying levels of 
accuracy of FRREED. The “no” support condition has no FRREED (the NEXRAD only 
condition). The “baseline” support condition employs a FRREED whose accuracy is consistent 
with current capability in meteorological modeling.  The “moderate” support condition employs a 
FRREED whose accuracy is likely at the top of what is achievable in meteorology in the near 
future.  The “high” support display provides a level of support that is likely unachievable in an 
aviation weather decision-making context without significant technological innovation. The 
accuracy of the FRREED was manipulated using the Brier score, which is a probability score 
widely established for assessing the accuracy of a probabilistic forecast by using both the predicted 
forecast probability and the outcome of the event (Brier, 1950; Murphy & Winkler, 1977; Yates, 
1990). The required baseline or moderate or high accuracy (i.e., the mean Brier score) was selected 




storm data. FRREED was simulated to produce probabilities for the forecasts from the available 
data. The participants in each experimental group received training in which feedback regarding 
their decision was presented after each trial. This was followed by a test phase in which feedback 
regarding the participant’s decision was presented after completing (flying) the entire storm (4 
trials).  The division of the experiment into the training and the test phase facilitates my evaluation 
of how much learning and transfer took place. The experimental study is a Qualtrics plus Pavlovia 
(Psychopy 3 online) (Peirce et al., 2019) web-based or lab-based computer study. 
The proposed hypotheses for the experimental study are the following:  
Effect of inclusion of FRREED on participants decision-making and calibration to the tool: 
• Hypothesis 1: The participants receiving probabilistic FRREED will make more accurate 
flight-path decisions (high proportion correct and high sensitivity) and confidence judgments 
(low Brier score) in order of the level of accuracy of the FRREED. The high accuracy FRREED 
will lead to better-calibrated participant decisions to the system, compared to the participants 
receiving lower support. 
Effect of learning on participants decision-making and calibration to the tool: 
• Hypothesis 2: The accuracy of the participants’ flight-path decisions and confidence judgments 
will improve as a function of training. The transfer of learning from training to test phase is 
expected. 
• Hypothesis 3: Performance will improve across training blocks as participants receive 




• Hypothesis 4: Performance will improve across storms as participants receive feedback and 
gain experience throughout the test phase. 
• Hypothesis 5: The unfolding behavior of a storm will improve the participants’ performance 
on later trials when storm unfolds compared to initial ones (within-storm). I predict that in 
subsequent trials, as the storm moves, the participants can use that additional movement 
information while making flight-path decisions. 
Effect of task type on performance: 
• Hypothesis 6: Performance on double route trials (relative judgment task) will be higher than 
performance on single route trials (the absolute judgment task) for all four groups. This 
prediction is based on the findings from the area of sensation and perception, which shows that 
people find it easier to make judgment on relative tasks compared to absolute tasks (E. U. 
Weber & Johnson, 2009).  
Role of trust in automation: 
• Hypothesis 7: The participants’ reliance or trust on the FRREED will change depending on the 
manipulated accuracy of the FRREED. I expect that reliance or trust will be positively 






  The experiment outlined in this section addresses the hypotheses presented before. The 
study is designed using Qualtrics and PsychoPy (Peirce et al., 2019) software for participants to 
make a weather-related flight-path safety decision. The experiment design was a 2 (trial type) x 2 
(experiment phase) x 4 (FRREED) mixed design. Both the trial type and the experiment phase 
manipulations are within-subject factors, and the FRREED manipulation is a between-subjects 
factor. The FRREED manipulation has four levels: 1) no support (NEXRAD only), 2) low support 
(NEXRAD + baseline-accuracy FRREED), 3) moderate support (NEXRAD + moderate-accuracy 
FRREED), and (4) high support (NEXRAD + high-accuracy FRREED). The trial type 
manipulation has two levels: 1) a single route trial (absolute judgment) and 2) a double route trial 
(relative judgment). The experiment phase manipulation has two levels: 1) the training phase and 
2) the test phase. The study has the following dependent variables: performance (proportion of 
correct weather-related decisions), trust score (trust in automation scale by Jian, Bisantz, and Drury 
(2000)), calibration (Brier and Brier skill score), sensitivity and bias (signal detection theory). 
2.1 Participants 
21 (Male, N= 20; Female, N= 1) pilots participated in the online version of the study 
advertised to them through flyers and emails sent to pilot academy listservs and posts on Reddit, 
pilot forums, and Facebook. Although almost 315 pilots opened the online experiment link, the 
attrition rate was very high, with 70% not proceeding beyond the consent form page, and others 
leaving in-between from the instructions to the experiment stage.  
I ran 343 undergraduate students in this study in Decision Processes Lab using the online 
experiment management system at Georgia Institute of Technology. Participants received course 




in the analysis. The discarded participants had issues with either the data file saved, or they pressed 
escape button in-between the study, or they skipped a lot of trials.  All the participants with 
available response data for more than 85% of the trials were considered for the analysis due to 
analysis methods being sensitive to a large amount of missing data. 
2.2 Materials   
Participants were presented with a simulated flight path in an adverse weather condition, and 
they had to decide whether the route was safe to continue flying based on the FAA’s 20-nmi rule. 
NEXRAD was used as a primary meteorological product to represent hazardous weather, and it 
was integrated with a probabilistic FRREED for three of the four groups. Fig. 3 represents an 
example of a single-route trial and the decision question that the participant had to answer. The 20 
nmi-radius circle (range ring) on the flight route represents the safe area around the current flight 
location, which was intended to serve as a guide for participants to keep clear of any red weather 
cells. The solid black line on the route is the projected 45 min future flight path for which 
participants had to make safety-decisions. The black ticks represent 15 min time intervals for the 
given route. The dashed line represents the aircraft’s previous flight path, which is there for 
representation purposes. Participants were asked to assume constant altitude (cruising altitude) and 
constant speed (140 knots) for the entire experiment (See APPENDIX A). 
The experiment consisted of a training phase followed by a test phase. Both the phases 
required the participants to decide the safety of flying on a given path(s) for the future 45 min by 
examining the given weather conditions. Fig. 3 represents a demonstration of a single route trial 
for the no support condition. Participants were given a pre-study questionnaire (see Appendix B 




automation scale in it. All the NEXRAD trial images were extracted from past hazardous storms 
in the US (see APPENDIX E). 
 
 
Figure 3. Single route trial with moderate-accuracy FRREED 
2.2.1 Training and Test Phase 
The training phase had 20 trials with both single and double route trials in equal proportion, 
presented at random. All the trials of the training phase were extracted from a different hazardous 
scenario (or storm). Fig. 4, represents one complete double-route trial. Before every decision trial, 
a loop of three NEXRAD images for every 15 min interval before the decision time were displayed 
once to provide the 45-minuite historical weather data for the decision point. Following every 




feedback was provided by three NEXRAD images (looped once) for every 15 min interval after 
the decision time point. This feedback was expected to facilitate the understanding of participants 
of the provided decision support and to enhance the transfer of learning to the test phase. 
The test phase presented ten different storms with four trials each. Five of the storms were 
constructed as single-route trials, while the remaining five were double-route trials. Storms were 
presented in random order to each participant. A complete three-hour flight path was constructed 
through each storm. The test phase was constructed to evaluate whether the learning of participants 
on the probabilistic FRREED and/or NEXRAD from the training phase transferred to the more 
ecological test (unfolding storms) phase. Fig. 5, illustrates what participants were presented for 
one storm with single-route trials during the test phase. The loop of three NEXRAD images before 
the decision trials was displayed once to provide the historical weather data before the decision 
time point (initial loop shown in Fig. 4). Following this, participants were asked to make a safety 
decision and confidence judgment for four subsequent 45 min flight segments (trials).  After the 
end of the fourth flight segment, participants were shown a combined feedback loop (Fig. 4) for 



















2.2.2 Probabilistic FRREED 
The probabilistic FRREED was simulated to have either high, moderate, or baseline 
accuracy as measured via Brier scores. The FRREED provides the probability that a given 
45-min-route will come within 20 nmi of hazardous weather at least once along the 
projected flight path. The probabilities are simulated such that the Brier Score of the high 
accuracy FRREED is 0.04, moderate accuracy FRREED is 0.09, and baseline accuracy 
FRREED is 0.17. The goal was to evaluate whether the high and the moderate support 
condition significantly improves upon the baseline or the no support condition in terms of 
both decision-making and calibration to uncertainty for operators. It is feasible to simulate 
the probabilities from the accuracy because radar images from the past hazardous storms 
have been used for this experiment, and the future outcome of those storms are already 
known (via the available radar record of the entire storm event). Fig. 4, represents a 
decision trial with a high accuracy FRREED providing the probability of path A as 69% 
and path B as 29%. This means path A has a 69% chance of intersecting the red cells in the 
20 nmi range ring during the next 45 min route shown, and path B has a 29% chance of 
intersecting the red cells. Ideally, if the FRREED was deterministic, the participant should 
always choose to go with the low probability routes. However, it is impossible to design a 
completely accurate system for hazardous storms due to uncertainty. So, it is important for 
people to account for this uncertainty in FRREED while using this for enhancing situation 







All the four experimental groups were tested on the same training and test phase 
with both single and double route trials. The manipulation defining each group was the 
accuracy level of the FRREED. The participants were randomly assigned to the four 
conditions: no support (Pilots, N=2; Students, N=73), baseline support (Pilots, N=7; 
Students, N=81), moderate support (Pilots, N=7; Students, N= 88), and high support 
(Pilots, N=5; Students, N=82). All participants went through the same radar images 
presented in the random order (see APPENDIX E).      
I did not provide any explicit information regarding the accuracy of the NEXRAD 
display to the participants because such information can distort use and expectations (Barg-
Walkow & Rogers, 2016), and I wanted to capture effects of experiential learning as 
cleanly as possible. Thus, I expected the participants to learn the accuracy of the displat 
from the feedback provided to them. The learning of accuracy in the four conditions is 
evaluated through the participants’ bias and sensitivity towards using the FRREED across 
trials. The transfer of learning is evaluated through relationship between training 
performance and test performance. 
2.4 Theory for Dependent Variables 
 The following sub-sections discusses the theory behind the following dependent 
measures: trust score, calibration (Brier and Brier skill score), and sensitivity and bias 
(signal detection theory) used in this study. It also discusses why the evaluation of these 
measures are necessary for the current study environment. 




Wickens, Gordon, Liu, and Lee (1998) defined automation as reliable when it does 
what the human operator expects it to do. In this study, by manipulating the accuracy of 
the display, its reliability is also being manipulated. The trust of users’ needs to be well-
calibrated to the actual reliability of the system while dealing with automated systems. That 
means the trust in automation should always be in direct proportion to the reliability of the 
automation, hence, when the reliability decreases, the user should be able to rely on 
themselves in deciding, and should look for other sources in the environment that can 
provide reliable information to guide the decision. This kind of appropriate calibration 
prevents issues of over-trust or distrust in automation (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997), where 
distrust is “when the person fails to trust the automation as much as it is appropriate 
(Wickens et al., 1998, p. 424)” and over trust or complacency is “ when the person trust 
the automation more than is warranted and can have serious negative consequences if 
automation is less than fully reliable” (Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993; Parasuraman 
& Riley, 1997). 
In this study, the accuracy of the display is being manipulated, and it is necessary 
to investigate participants’ trust calibration to this manipulated accuracy of the display. 
Therefore, at the end of the experiment, participants were asked to respond to a 12-item 
Trust in Automation scale, which is developed by Jian et al. (2000). It is one of the most 
used scale in the Trust literature. The total score on the scale indicates the level of trust 







Figure 6. Trust in automation scale by Jian et al. (2000) 
2.4.2 Confidence Judgments and Calibration 
Confidence Judgment is a process of asking participants to make a judgment on a 
percentage or probability score about how confident they are that their decision is correct, 
immediately after they respond to the task question (Efklides & Misailidi, 2010). It is 
optimal to take confidence judgment on a continuous scale having 5-10 categories 
McKelvie (1978). Less than 5 categories lead to the loss of discriminative power and 




categories). Based on this literature, a continuous scale with 10 categories is included for 
participants to rate their flight-path safety decision (Shown in Fig. 4). N. Weber and Brewer 
(2003, p. 490) state that “Calibration refers to the extent to which participants’ judgments 
of confidence in their decision (made on percentile scale) correspond with the actual 
probability that their decision was correct”. For example, if the person is 70% confident in 
his decision, and has a 70% probability of being accurate, then the confidence judgment 
can be said to be accurately calibrated to the truth. The relationship between confidence 
judgment and accuracy is analyzed using the probability scoring method described in the 
next sub-section. 
2.4.3 Brier Score and Brier Skill Score  
The most common metric for the analysis of confidence judgment is a probability 
score known as the Brier Score (Brier, 1950; Murphy & Winkler, 1977; Yates, 1990). The 
Brier score (BS) is a proper scoring rule that provides a measure of the accuracy of 
confidence judgments: 
𝐵𝑆 =  
1
𝑁





Equation 1: Brier Score 
The Brier score is described by Eq. 1, where N is the total number of probability or 
confidence assessments, ct is the tth confidence judgment, and ot is the outcome index for 
the tth confidence judgment. If the event occurs, then ot =1, and if the event does not occur, 
then ot =0.  Thus, the Brier score is the average squared deviation between the confidence 




Yates, 1990). The lower the Brier score for a set of predictions, the better the predictions 
are calibrated (i.e., less error in predictions).   
Another measure, the Brier Skill Score (BSS) acts is an overall measure of the 
system’s performance (Wilks, 1995).  It measures the relative skill of a forecast above a 





Equation 2: Brier Skill Score 
It ranges from minus infinity to 1. BSS= 0 implies no skill compared to the 
reference forecast. BSS=1, imply perfect score 
Hence, BS is a measure of the accuracy of predictions or forecasts. BSS is a 
measure of the proportion of improvement in accuracy over the reference (Dance, Ebert, 
& Scurrah, 2010). 
2.4.4 Signal Detection Theory 
Most decisions in real-life take place in the presence of some uncertainty because 
of inherent ambiguity in the system and/or time pressure associated with decision-making. 
Signal detection theory (SDT) provides a method to model decision making under 
uncertain situations (Swets, Dawes, & Monahan, 2000). It has its roots in sensory 
experiments, where there is a need to detect the presence of a signal in a noisy environment.  
For example, in the task of identifying a tumor from a patient’s CT scan, there is 




of the task (Heeger, 2003). SDT accounts for four possible outcomes possible in an 
uncertain situation (shown in Table 2): Hit (tumor present and doctor responds “yes”), Miss 
(tumor present and doctor responds “no”), False Alarm (tumor absent and doctor responds 
“yes”), and Correct Rejection (tumor absent and doctor responds “no”). According to SDT, 
the response to a stimulus depends both on the individual’s sensitivity to the stimulus in 
the presence of noise and on the individual’s decision criterion (or bias).   
Table 2. Outcomes table for signal detection theory 
 Response: Yes Response: No 
Stimuli present Hit (H) Miss (M) 
Stimulus absent False alarm (FA) Correct rejection (CR) 
Sensitivity or Discriminability Index (d’) is the ability to tell that two signals are different. 
𝑑’ =  𝑍𝐹𝐴 − 𝑍𝐻𝑖𝑡 
Equation 3: Sensitivity or Discriminability Index 
Response Bias or Criterion (C) is an individual’s implicit decision threshold above which 
they respond “yes” to the presence of a signal and below which they respond “no” to the 
presence of a signal.  
𝐶 =  −(𝑍𝐹𝐴 + 𝑍𝐻𝑖𝑡)/2 







This section will address the hypotheses presented in the introduction section 
through both the analysis description and findings. The sub-sections are presented in terms 
of the dependent variables measured. Bonferroni corrections to alpha levels are used when 
required to control for familywise Type 1 error. 
3.1 Performance (Proportion Correct) Trends across Conditions 
Participant performance is defined as a binary outcome with correct response coded 
as 1 and incorrect response coded as 0 for every trial for each participant. Therefore, the 
mean performance closer to 1 is better and closer to 0 is poor. Fig. 7 shows the trend in the 
increase in mean performance for student data with an increase in the level of support. The 
trend indicates that student participants did rely on the FRREED to improve their 
performance over the no-support condition (NEXRAD only). In the same Fig 7, the trend 
for mean performance for pilots’ data is not as good as the students except for the high 
support condition. However, N=23 for pilots’ data and N=324 for student participants’ 
data. Hence, I am going to make conclusions going forward cautionary, but there doesn’t 
seem to be any large discrepancy between expert-novice performance that I can detect.  
Also, the students performed nearly as close to the pilots in two conditions, outperformed 
in one, and are slightly below in the no support condition. Hence, with the acknowledged 
limitation, it is safe to make conclusions about the usability of FRREED based on student 
data from this point onwards. It is also interesting to mention here that N=2 for no-support 
condition in pilots, and we observed the highest attrition rate for pilots in this condition. 




further evidence on why our student participants lagged in this condition. From this point 
onwards, results will only focus on student participants due to lack of power for pilot 
population. 
 
Figure 7. Effect of level of support on performance 
3.2 Sensitivity and Bias Analysis 
A decision support in this context should facilitate people’s ability to discriminate 
if their path will be intersected by hazardous weather (sensitivity). Although it is important 




aversion (response thresholds), both aspects of decision making are important to evaluation 
(Swets et al., 2000).  
The class of Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) for categorical data can be 
configured to estimate sensitivity and bias parameters within a single model specification 
(via the use of a probit link function). Using the probit link function, parameter estimate 
for each factor manipulation represent the changes in decision threshold (in beta units), and 
parameter estimates for each factor manipulation crossed with “truth,” the actual 
occurrence of the storm, represents changes in discriminability (in d-prime units). In Table 
3, examining the variables that interacted with truth shows that discriminability improved 
as the level of support increased (accuracy of tool) (mean trend shown in Fig. 8).  
Discriminability also improved more (p<0.0001) in the test phase compared to the training 
phase with the increase in the level of support (Truth × Experiment Phase × Condition), and 
it also improved more in double route trials (p<0.01) compared to single route trials with 
the increase in the level of support (Truth × Trial Type × Condition). These results are in 
support of hypotheses 1, 2, and 6. 
Although there weren’t any a priori predictions concerning decision thresholds, it 
is still important to evaluate. The decision thresholds significantly increased as the level of 
decision support increased (mean trend shown in Fig. 9). This is consistent with the idea 
that the decision thresholds are positively correlated with the accuracy of the FRREED; 








Table 3. Summary statistics for Type 3 generalized estimating equations analysis, 
displaying flight-path safety decisions regressed on information characteristics and task 
outcome  
Independent Variable Df Wald Chi-Square Statistic 
Condition 3 9.30* 
Trial Type 1 13.51*** 
Truth 1 945.16**** 
Experiment Phase 1 45.74**** 
Condition × Trial Type 3 7.91 
Condition × Truth  3 89.14**** 
Condition × Experiment Phase 3 5.68 
Trial Type × Truth 1 106.70**** 
Trial Type × Experiment Phase 1 104.18**** 
Truth × Experiment Phase 1 89.49**** 
Condition × Trial Type × Truth 3 15.32** 
Condition × Trial Type × Experiment Phase 3 15.49** 
Condition × Truth × Experiment Phase 3 32.46**** 
Trial Type × Truth × Experiment Phase 1 3.24 









Figure 8. Trend in mean discriminability across conditions 
 




3.3 Confidence Judgment Calibration 
Brier Score (BS) measurements are used to test the calibration of participant 
confidence judgments. There is a significant decrease in the mean Brier Score for 
participants as the accuracy of the decision support increases (Table 4). Although the 
calibration of the participants increased as the accuracy of the decision support increased, 
the mean BS is still lower than the corresponding BS for the FRREED itself.  Thus, the 
participants are not perfectly calibrated to the accuracy of the FRREED and do not utilize 
all the information provided by the FRREED to its potential. Another important 
observation to note is mean BS for NEXRAD-only condition is approximately equal to 
mean BS of 0.25 for chance performance.  
I calculated the Brier Skill Score (BSS) to scale the improvement in accuracy 
provided by the FRREED compared to the control (no support -NEXRAD only) condition. 
The higher the BSS means, the greater the proportion of improvement in calibration over 
the control condition. Table 4, shows that BSS is highest for the high support condition, 
and all the FRREED conditions improved participants’ forecasting skill above the control 
condition. 
For the statistical analyses of Brier Scores, I employed a Generalized Linear Model 
for repeated measures to test the differences in Brier Scores between conditions, trial type, 
and phase (Table 4). This analysis indicate that Brier Scores significantly decreased (better 
calibration) as the level of support increased.  Moreover, the Brier Scores were significantly 




test phase compared to the training phase. These findings yield support for the calibration 
predictions of hypotheses 1, 2, and 6. 
Table 4. Group wise Mean Brier Score and Brier Skill Scores 
Condition Mean BS 
for 
FRREED 
Mean BS for 
Participants 
Mean BS for Participants 
 
 






No Support - .24 .26 .24 - 
Baseline Support 0.18 .22 .25 .22 0.08 
Moderate Support 0.09 .18 .21 .16 0.26 
High Support 0.04 .14 .18 .12 0.41 
Table 5. Summary statistics for Type 3 generalized linear model analysis, displaying Brier 
Score regressed on information characteristics 
Independent Variable Df Wald Chi-Square Statistic 
Condition 3 102.01**** 
Trial Type 1 79.88**** 
Experiment Phase 1 124.39**** 
Condition × Trial Type 3 12.47 
Condition × Experiment Phase 3 9.86* 
Trial Type × Experiment Phase 1 10.11** 








3.4 Learning Within-Subject 
The following sub-sections addresses all the learning hypotheses including transfer 
of learning, within-phase learning, and unfolding-order learning. 
3.4.1 Transfer of Learning 
I predicted that the performance in the training phase (overall, first-half, and 
second-half) will predict the performance in the test phase. To evaluate the transfer of 
learning predictions, I calculated the Kendall’s tau-b correlation between performance in 
the training and the test phases for each condition. There was a positive correlation between 
the overall training phase performance and the test phase performance (Table 6). The 
correlation was significant for all the FRREED conditions and the strength of correlation 
increased as the accuracy of the FRREED increased. The correlation was not significant 
for the no support condition, indicating that NEXRAD-only was insufficient to facilitate 
transfer. Table 6 also reports performance correlations between first-half (10 trials) or 
second-half (10 trials) of the training phase with the test phase. There is similar but weaker 
trend for these correlations. Correlations were also calculated for Brier Score between the 
training and the test phases (Table 6) to check how the calibration in the training predicts 
calibration in the test. The BS correlation was significant for all the conditions and the 
strength of correlation increased as the accuracy of the support increased. Hence, the 
proposed probabilistic support facilitated transfer to a more ecological environment. These 





Table 6. Kendall’s Tau and Pearson’s Correlations [τb (r)] matrix between training and test 
phase  













Overall .14 (.16) .20
**(.29) .47****(.61) .66****(.77) .45**** (.61) 
First-
Half  
.08 (.08) .23*(.28) .28****(.37) .52****(.61) .33****(.43) 
Second 
Half  
.10 (.14) .06(.11) .44****(.56) .67****(.77) .42****(.55) 





** (.38) .26**** (38) .53**** (.69) .60**** (.76) .48**** (.71) 
 First-
Half  
.14 (.23) .23** (.299) .34**** (.44) .45****(.57) .34**** (.49) 
 Second 
Half  





3.4.2 Training Phase Learning  
In hypothesis 3, I predicted that performance should improve across training blocks 
due to learning through feedback. To test hypothesis 3, 20 trials of the training phase were 
divided into 5 training blocks with 4 trials each (in order of trial presentation). I employed 
a Generalized Linear Model for repeated measures to test the differences in performance 




model for all the within-subject learning hypotheses (3,4, and 5), because all the hazardous 
storms were different in strength, movement, and uncertainty. The analysis indicates that 
the main effect of training blocks is significant, i.e., performance significantly increased 
across training blocks (Fig. 10). Therefore, providing support for the learning prediction of 
hypothesis 3. There is no significant interaction between condition and training blocks, 
indicating that the performance over subsequent training blocks doesn’t change 
significantly with the change in the level of support.  
Moreover, as expected, the main effect of scenario is significant, indicating 
significant differences in performance for all 20 trials of the training phase (Figure 11). 
Also, there is significant interaction between training blocks and scenario, indicating that 
learning is not consistent across all training blocks. This is likely due to scenario difficulty 
(e.g., scenarios - 4, 25). The interaction between condition and scenario is also significant, 
indicating that easier scenarios were easier and difficult were less difficult in order of the 
support level received by participants. 
Table 7. Summary statistics for Type 3 generalized linear model analysis, displaying 
performance in the training phase regressed on information characteristics 
Independent Variable Df Wald Chi-Square Statistic 
Condition 3 25.31**** 
Scenario 19 856.89**** 
Training Blocks 4 24.36**** 
Condition × Training Blocks 12 13.24 
Condition × Scenario 57 96.02** 














Figure 11. Trend in mean performance for different scenarios across conditions 
 
3.4.3 Test Phase Learning 
In the test phase, each scenario had 4 different unfolding trials in which the same 
storm was evolving in time. To address my predictions regarding learning within the test 
phase, I employed a Generalized Linear Model for repeated measures to test the differences 
in performance between conditions, storm presentation order, unfolding trial order, and 




support for learning predictions with subsequent storms (Fig. 12). Moreover, the 
interaction between condition and storm presentation order is also significant, indicating 
that performance improved within the test phase, and it improved more for the high support 
condition compared to the other support levels. Therefore, providing support for the 
learning predictions for the test phase in hypothesis 4. Also, the scenarios differed in 
difficulty level evident from the significant main effect of scenario (Fig. 13).  
For the unfolding trial order, I predicted that performance will improve when going 
from trial 1 to trial 4 for all scenarios in the test phase due to learning and understanding a 
particular storm. The main effect of unfolding trial order and the interaction between 
unfolding trial order and condition is significant (Table 8). However, the trend from trial 1 
to trial 4 is completely opposite of what was expected. The performance decreases from 1 
to 4, and it decreases less for high support compared to other support levels (Fig. 14). 
Hence, there was no support for the unfolding predictions in hypothesis 5. However, 
consistent decreasing performance trend across all support levels can be attributed to the 
additional NEXRAD loop available before the initial trial but was not available later as the 
storm unfolded.  
Table 8. Summary statistics for Type 3 generalized linear model analysis, displaying 
performance in the test phase regressed on information characteristics 
Independent Variable Df Wald Chi-Square Statistic 
Condition 3 91.88**** 
Scenario 9 535.85**** 
Storm Presentation Order 9 18.24* 




Table 9. Continued 
Independent Variable Df Wald Chi-Square Statistic 
Condition × Scenario 27 82.25**** 
Condition × Storm Presentation Order 27 51.60** 
Condition × Unfolding Trial Order 9 37.21**** 
Storm Presentation Order× Unfolding Trial Order 27 39.35 










Figure 13. Trend in mean performance for different scenarios across conditions 




3.5 Trust in Automation 
This section addresses hypothesis 7 concerning trust (or reliance) in the system. 
Prior to testing this hypothesis, an evaluation of how the component trust (positively 
worded items) and the component distrust (negatively worded items) scores are related is 
done for the entire data. The component trust and the component distrust scores are found 
to be significantly negatively correlated, r= - 0.494 and p<0.0001. The trust score is 
calculated by reverse scoring the first five items in the trust scale (distrust questions) and 
then taking an average of all 12 responses. Fig. 15 shows the group-wise mean trust scores. 
A one-way ANOVA indicates a significant mean difference in trust score across 
support level, F=6.524, and p=0.0001<0.05. This is followed by Tukey’s HSD test for post-
hoc comparisons to test where the mean difference exists. However, the post-hoc 
comparisons only indicate significant mean differences in trust scores between the baseline 
support and the moderate support conditions, and the baseline and the high support 
conditions, p=0.003 < 0.008. Hence, there is only partial evidence found for hypothesis 7. 
This is counter-intuitive because of the significant calibration of participants’ confidence 
judgment to the accuracy of the support conditions. 
 found in Section 3.3. However, several of the items on the trust in automation scale 
do not seem particularly relevant to the context of a probabilistic decision support tool. 
This makes sense in that the trust scale items are designed for higher levels of automation 
or warning systems, which provides deterministic information to the users. Therefore, I 
decided to do some exploratory analysis by picking up the three most relevant items to the 




item about confidence in the system, trust in the system, and dependability of the system 
were selected and analyzed for any mean differences across groups through one-way 
ANOVA followed by post-hoc comparisons. A one-way ANOVA indicates significant 
mean difference in trust score across support level for the confidence item (F= 3.756 
p=0.011<0.05), the dependability item (F= 5.194 p=0.002<0.05), and the trust item 
(F=6.233 p=0.0001<0.05). However, none of the post-hoc comparisons were significant 
for the confidence item. The mean score was significantly different between the baseline 
and the moderate support conditions for the dependability item (MD= -0.82, 
p=0.001<0.008). The mean score was significantly different for the no support and the 
baseline support conditions (MD= -0.71, p=0.005<0.008), and the baseline support and the 
moderate support conditions (MD= -0.739, p=0.002<0.008) for the trust item. Therefore, 
these exploratory results were similar to what I found for the overall trust score previously. 
These findings led to further exploratory analysis of how the trust scale and its 
individual items correlate with the Confidence Judgment and Brier Scores measured 
previously. This comes from the idea that both the previously measured Confidence 
Judgment (CJ) and Brier Scores (BS) are logical substitutes for the measure of trust 
(reliance) in the system. Kendall’s tau and Pearson correlation were calculated between 
overall trust score, the component trust score, the component distrust score, and the 
individual trust scale items with Brier Scores and Confidence Judgments (Table 9). The 
component distrust score and the score from five distrust items are expected to be 
negatively correlated with the CJ and positively correlated with the BS. The overall trust 
score, the component trust score, and the score from seven trust items are expected to be 




score and the component trust score obtained from 7 trust items are found to be 
significantly correlated with CJ (p<0.0001) and BS (p<0.0001) in the expected direction 
for only the high support condition. A similar trend is also observed in all seven trust items. 
Six out of the seven trust items have significant correlation with BS and CJ for the high 
support condition only, and most of the correlations for the other support conditions are 
not significant. The component distrust score (from five items) and five individual distrust 
items are not correlated with CJ and BS except for a small significant correlation between 
the BS and the component distrust score (for high support), the BS and the wary item (for 
no support), and the BS and the deceptive system item (for moderate support). The 
correlation matrix from Table 9 further supports my claim that the trust scale does not fit 
the context of a probabilistic decision support tool, especially with all the distrust items. 
Also, the trust scale seems to be correlated with the CJ and BS for only the high support 
condition indicating the sensitivity of the scale to the accuracy of the support provided. 




Table 10. Kendall’s Tau and Pearson’s correlations [τb (r)] matrix for trust scale items, and 
Confidence Judgments and Brier Scores 




High Support Total 
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Integrity .08  
(.10) 
.22*   
(.31) 




















Table 9. Continued 




High Support Total 

























































































This study explored a predictive FRREED providing the cumulative risk associated 
with a weather hazard and asking participants to make flight-path safety judgments. The 
research investigated the transfer of learning, trust calibration to the accuracy of the system, 
judgment calibration, and the appropriate representation of uncertainty required to improve 
performance and decision-making. The results show that operators did rely on the 
FRREED to improve their performance over the no-support condition. The Brier Skill 
Score for the high support condition in reference to the no support condition was 0.41. 
Therefore, showing that the level of performance of the operators improved in terms of 
both calibration and resolution as support increased in its accuracy. These results 
demonstrate that the operator performance is not acceptable in absolute terms with the use 
support level with accuracy commensurate with the current capability of meteorological 
probability forecasts (no support, BSS=0, or baseline support, BSS=0.07).  Therefore, 
suggesting a need for similar research with pilots followed by the validation of training 
regimes for the safe introduction of high-accuracy probabilistic decision-aids in general 
aviation cockpits.  
A myriad of performance and calibration measures show significant differences 
between different levels of support conditions very consistently. However, the operators 
are still not completely calibrated to the accuracy of the tool (Table 4), and there is further 
room for improvement here. The strong transfer of learning effects from the training phase 
to the test phase (unfolding storms) in FRREED conditions demonstrated success in 




operators may not be able to use probabilistic risk estimates to their full potential without 
training. The learning effects within the training and the test phase shows the importance 
of enhancing learning via multiple trials- and scenario-based training, which is suggestive 
that experience-based training modules could be effective method for training operators on 
probabilistic weather risk estimates.  
I predicted that performance was going to increase in unfolding trials as more 
information about the storm movement would became available to the operator as the storm 
unfolded. However, I found an opposite trend that shows the decrements in performance 
when you move farther away in the storm. Perhaps this might be because operators find it 
challenging to extract cues about storm movement in the absence of the NEXRAD initial 
loop after the first unfolding trial. The performance decrement trend might be due to the 
lack of feedback after every unfolding trial, which might have facilitated the storm 
movement’s understanding. This finding emphasizes a need for constant feedback and 
constant past data to make real-time decisions about hazardous weather. 
The results from the trust in automation scale indicate that operators were neutral 
toward the support tool. Hence, the trust scores for operators don’t seem to calibrate with 
their actual performance in the task. This is non-intuitive because all the performance and 
calibration measures showed that people did rely on using the FRREED. Interestingly, the 
exploratory analysis shows that the level of trust in the FRREED was only calibrated to the 
operator’s objective performance when the FRREED was highly accurate. Thus, the non-
intuitive trend in trust scores can be attributed to the structure of the trust scale itself, which 
seems suitable for a higher level of automation instead of an aid that renders uncertainty 




their trust in the system only when the system is highly accurate. Also, the design of the 
experiment might be affecting the trust calibration (Stuck & Walker, 2020), because of the 
inability of student participants to perceive the risk associated with intersecting a storm 
while flying. 
4.1 Implications 
Overall, the results of this thesis project have implications for new interventions in 
the aviation industry. It has implications for display designers in terms of introducing 
products with probabilistic weather information into the market place as well as 
introducing the regulatory regime for the entry of such products into the cockpit. These 
results guide the development of probabilistic decision aids that people can comprehend 
easily. Thus, it addresses some of the issues faced by earlier attempts by Matthews and 
DeLaura (2010), Kronfeld (2003), and others (Table 1), in introducing qualitative 
probabilistic risk information in cockpits which pilots continued to underestimate. The 
results of the transfer of learning and within-phase learning can help in developing and 
improvising training programs for weather displays. This finding should reinforce the need 
for general aviation pilot training to include dedicated modules for weather displays and 
the interpretation of probabilistic weather products, which is only a negligible portion of 
the training they receive currently.  
The results also contribute to basic research in judgment and decision making about 
how to facilitate people’s understanding of cumulative risk and uncertainty. It specifically 
addresses the long-believed notion in decision-making literature that lay people find 




more commonly known frequency format. There is a multitude of psychological evidence 
showing how people have difficulty in understanding probabilities compared to 
frequencies (Slovic, 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Our results clearly demonstrate 
the participants’ ability to understand risk estimates in probability format and calibrate 
themselves to the accuracy of those risk estimates. Hence, further providing evidence that 
people can use probability formats effectively (c.f., the work of Joslyn and Nichols (2009) 
showing the understanding of probabilistic rain forecasts amongst non-experts).  
The results have implications for some of the previous challenges demonstrated in 
conveying cumulative risk in various domains like breast-cancer medication risk 
(Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2008) , contraception methods related risk (De La Maza et al., 
2019), stroke recurrence risk (Fuller et al., 2004), flood risk (De La Maza et al., 2019), etc. 
mentioned before. The results show that by scenario- and feedback-based training it is 
possible to calibrate people’s judgment and decision-making to the numerical risk 
estimates and the inherent uncertainty in the complex mission-centric task of flight-route 
judgments. Therefore, this can be extended to other less complex domains in which the 
events (like red cells on NEXRAD) are not completely correlated with each other. 
4.2 Limitations  
This study had two major goals. First, to find the best way to convey cumulative 
risk in an uncertain environment through probabilistic risk estimates and second, to 
determine what level of accuracy of these probabilistic displays will facilitate learning and 
performance. To support these two goals, the experiment consisted of four groups 




go through two phases to facilitate the transfer of learning. Although the intent was to make 
the test phase more like a continuous flying task, only static NEXRAD images were 
provided to the participants. Also, participants had very little control to go over the initial 
loop multiple times. An actual general aviation cockpit NEXRAD display allows users to 
go over the past loop of NEXRAD images again and again. Yet, it was restricted in the 
current experiment to once to control the NEXRAD loop from confounding the effect of 
the risk estimates on operator performance. It was also done to restrict the length of the 
study by keeping every task timed.  
Another major limitation is that the participant pool comprised of a convenience 
sample (undergraduate students) who have little to no experience with flying or dealing 
with hazardous weather in any capacity. Although all the efforts were made to run the 
experiment online on a web browser, recruiting professional pilots to participate in the 
study was the biggest hurdle. However, if students can understand the quantitative estimate 
of risk and can calibrate themselves to the accuracy of the estimates, I predict that when 
pilots will be provided with the decision aid of this high accuracy, they will be able to use 
it efficiently. 
4.3 Future Research 
Future research should build upon the findings of this study by performing 
ensemble modeling on big weather data from the past, which can help in getting actual 
real-time cumulative risk values. Along with this, the study should be conducted with a 
high-fidelity flight simulator and professional pilots to evaluate how the current findings 




be to evaluate the ways to build operator trust in the kind of probabilistic systems evaluated 
in this study. The trust in automation results also highlights the need to build a trust in 
automation scale that is catered to predictive decision-support systems. Future research 
should also investigate ways to reach the accuracy of the high support condition 
implemented in this study, which requires technological innovations not present at this 






APPENDIX A. PARTICIPANT INSTRUCTIONS 
The upcoming pages show the exact representation of the instructions that were displayed 
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